The chain transaction will not be completed as soon as it is submitted. Most transactions enter the pending queue and the packing order is determined by the outlet. It is because the order can be reordered that the MEV in the encrypted market has evolved around the “who first executes” yield space.
The order of the transaction determines who takes the proceeds.
MEV is referred to as “maximum recoverable value”. It was originally referred to as “the miner's recoverable value” and later changed its name with the shift to a certificationer mechanism, but the core did not change: whoever has the right to order the trade within the block could benefit from it.
On the public chain, transactions to be confirmed are usually visible. The outlet can decide which transactions are to be executed first, which are to be executed later, or even whether to be included in the block. As long as different order results in different results, this sort of ranking can be realized.
This is why MEV is often called "hidden taxes". Ordinary users do not necessarily see the loss directly, but bear the costs in terms of poorer transaction prices, higher slide points or higher handling fees.
arbitrage, liquidation and clamp attacks are most common
MEV is not just an act, but a set of different strategies. The most common are arbitrage, liquidation and clamp attacks. The arbitrage means that robots buy and sell with a different DEX price difference; liquidation takes place after the mortgage rate of the loan agreement breaks down, and robots compete for liquidation and obtain discount assets.
The first two categories are usually considered to be relatively neutral MEVs. arbitrage helps to reduce price deviations between different markets, while liquidation helps to maintain the solvency of loan agreements. The most controversial is a clamp attack, in which robots buy before a large amount of money is exchanged by the user and sell for profit when the user has made a deal at a lower price.
Flashbots makes the MEV into an open market.
With increased chain competition, MEV has evolved from a fragmented robotic behavior to a well-defined industrial chain. The searcher continuously scans the memory pool and chain state, looking for arbitrage, clearing or clamp opportunities, and wraps multiple transactions into enforceable scenarios.
The programmes are then handed over to the builder, who is responsible for the cluster and offers to the certifying officer. The certifier chooses a block programme with higher returns. The emergence of Flashbots and MEV-Boost allows the process to be further standardized, so that the certifying officer does not have to run a complex strategy in person, and can obtain additional benefits through access to external builders.
However, this structure has not eliminated the problem. It merely makes more transparent “who draws value and how the proceeds are distributed”. For ordinary users, a more realistic response would be to use private trading channels to avoid exposing large orders directly to open memory pools or choosing a trading platform with MEV protection.