The EIP developer submitted a new EIP draft to rebuild the deposit contract used by the certifier when entering the pledge system. This is the first time that the Taifeng has prepared, in the form of a clear proposal, the future transition of the pledge layer to the back quantum password system.
The new contract leaves more data space.
The existing contract dies the BLS12-381 parameter in the rules, fixed the length of the public key to 48 bytes and the signature-related metadata to 96 bytes. This design applies to the current system of certifiers, but does not accommodate the larger key and voucher data required for the back quantum programme.
The new contract proposed in the draft allows for a maximum of 8,192 bytes of public key and voucher metadata. Each deposit also requires a statement of the “certificate programme” used. The current draft only defines option 0, corresponding to the existing BLS system.
Add Unreversible Decommission Status
The new contract designed three operational states: disable, allow BLS deposits and permanently stop new BLS deposits. According to the draft, the BLS certifier could not be re-opened once the system had called for the conversion of the contract to decommissioning status.
This means that the new entrances to the old programme will be permanently closed if the new voucher system is formally moved to the Ether. However, the specific format of the future later quantum certifier key still needs to be defined separately by the successor EIP.
The address and timing of the contract are still pending.
The proposal is still awaiting editorial review at the EIP warehouse. The contractual address, the deployment code, and the activation time are not yet determined. The proposal itself, which is primarily responsible for the transfer of deposit data to the consensus level, does not determine the actual realization of the Quantum password after that step.
To be truly effective, there is also a need for a synergistic upgrading of the executive and consensus layers, i.e., a cross-layered network fork. Thomas Coratger, one of the authors of the proposal, stated on the same day that the later quantum code migration was not a simple upgrade.
8KB Upper cap against candidate options
In summing up the views of Stanford cipher Dan Boneh, Coratger mentioned that Bitcoin and Ethera were now more in favour of a Hashi-based signature programme, as such programmes relied on security assumptions that were closer to existing networks.
NIST Standardized Post-state Post-Quantities Signature Program, with individual signature data of approximately 8KB size, which corresponds to the upper limit set by the new contract. Quantities Security Project Eleven previously estimated that by 2033, machines capable of breaking elliptical curve signatures were more than 50% likely to appear in 2030 at the earliest; its analysis also stated that more than 65% of ETH was at an address where the public key was already exposed.