Aave's founder, Stani, questioned the latest EIP-8361: zero-revenue pledge against ETA ecology

On 5 August, the founder of Aave, Stani Kulechov, published a long paper in which he systematically challenged the progressive release of the EIP-8361 destruction proposal. The proposal is to reduce the net pledge rate to zero by gradually destroying the release proceeds of the Consensus Layer, when a total of 6.025 million ETH is pledged (about 50 per cent of the total supply). Stani pointed out that the second-tier chain effect of the proposal was not sufficiently modelled and would damage the ecological foundations of the Taifong from multidimensional dimensions. The core objection logic of Stani consists of four points: first, the zero-benefit mechanism increases the centralization of the pledge in reverse. Household certifiers, bound by fixed hardware, electricity costs, will be the first to exit, while non-revenue-driven subjects such as ETF issuers, exchanges, business funds, etc., will remain in place on a continuous basis, reinforcing the concentration of hosting institutions that the proposal aims to contain. At the same time, MEV gains are not affected by the proposal and the size advantages of the head professional operator will be further expanded. Second, one hostage detainee is at risk of double taxation and operation. The proposal follows a “full release before destruction” path, whereby if tax authorities rate the full amount of the tax and the destruction portion as capital loss, there will be post-tax losses at the household node; and, with no change in the penalty criteria for failure, the recovery cycle of the net gain after the loss of the node will be extended by a maximum of 14 times, further crushing the living space of the scattered household. Third, ETH will lose the core differentiated value of interest-bearing assets. The pledge proceeds are the chain-based ETH interest rate pricing benchmark, and a significant contraction of the proceeds will result in DeFi lending, fixed-income markets losing price anchors, and the chain-based funds will shift to annualized 4-5 per cent stabilization currency. For institutional investors, predictable returns are the core competitive advantage of ETH vis-à-vis BTC, and ETH loses differential competitiveness in value storage tracks with zero returns and large fluctuations. Fourth, an increase in the income ratio of MEV would undermine the neutrality of the chain. After the proposal landed, the MEV ' s share of the total certificationer ' s income would rise from the current level of 7 per cent to almost 30 per cent, and the operator would be encouraged to give priority to the trunking nodes supporting the review, undermining the credibility and neutrality of the Taifung; if the MEV destruction mechanism were added, the certificationer ' s income would be almost entirely zero. At the same time, Stani made a request for improvement by requesting the proponents to publish a post-tax assessment of individual nodes, a tax opinion of the mainstream jurisdiction, a model of the DeFi ecological cascade risk, and to set a non-zero net gain floor, suggesting that the issue of pledge concentration should be addressed directly rather than stifling the gains of the entire certifying officer. He stressed that the increase in the pledge rate was a normal expression of ecological maturity and that the proposal would at the same time jeopardize the decentrization of the certifier, the ecological depth of DeFi and institutional needs, and that the overall risk was far greater than the benefits of supply contraction。