There was general support from the Quantum Safety Industry for the Government of Trump ' s advance from 2035 to 2031 for the United States federal system ' s post-quantum password. However, several researchers also noted that the migration of decentrized networks, such as Bitcoin, is still slow and that industry coordination is much more difficult than traditional institutions in the face of the potential threat of quantum computing.

Federal timetable advanced to 2031

Reports indicate that the executive order signed by Trump on Monday required the Federal Government to accelerate the transition to a back-quant code system. According to several of the researchers interviewed, this schedule is closer to the rate of development of quantum calculations over the past two years.

Stefan Leichnauer, Vice-President and Chief Scientist of SandboxAQ Engineering, stated that it was difficult to determine precisely when a quantum computer with a realistic ability to decipher would appear, but would be a credible area for the next 3 to 10 years. The problem is that once such a system has emerged, the consequences for the existing encryption system will be very direct and the migration cannot be delayed any longer.

Project Eleven CEO Alex Preden agreed that it was no surprise that the White House had adjusted its schedule. He said that, if it had been two years ago, the industry would hardly have thought that there was a realistic possibility that the relevant capabilities would emerge by 2030, but that probability could no longer be ignored.

  • Project Eleven estimate: 50% probability of a relevant quantum computer being present by 2033
  • The agency estimates that the probability is about 10% before 2030.
  • Some industry road maps have narrowed the window to 2028 to 2030

Researchers say the threat is not just a long-term problem.

Paul Simers, Executive Director of the Quantum Industry Union, said that the more pressing issue is not just a technological breakthrough in the future, but rather that the attackers may already be collecting encrypted data and waiting for future decryption capabilities. This means that risk does not remain entirely theoretical.

Quantum physicist Anastasia Marchenkova argued that high government emphasis on quantum competition could help to attract budget, talent and industrial capital into this area, but could also raise external expectations. She noted that the real difficulties were not slogans, but algorithm selection, system adaptation and large-scale deployment.

According to Christopher Tam, the head of BTQ Technology Innovations, 2031 is still slow for the federal high-value system, as some technology companies have set the target for later quantum migration at 2029. He also mentioned that such executive orders mainly covered the federal system and had limited direct constraints on the financial sector and the wider industrial chain.

Bitcoin is facing more complex migration coordination.

The difficulty for the encryption industry is that Bitcoin does not have a single subject that can directly enforce executive orders. Researchers have pointed out that banks or payment agencies can upgrade under supervision, but that the movement of the Bitcoin network requires cooperation among developers, miners, exchanges, trustees and large holders.

In March this year, BTTQ Technologies launched a Bitcoin Quantum Resistance Testing Network based on BIP-360. In April, an additional BIP-361 was proposed to freeze assets at an old address that had not been moved to a quantum resistance address. Meanwhile, networks such as Stellar and Algorand have published their own Quantum Password Road Map.

Pruden indicated that while there had been a marked rise in market awareness of the problem over the past year, real entry into the implementation phase remained limited. In the case of Bitcoin, the core issue at hand is not just whether or not to move, but who to drive, how to coordinate and when to build a sufficiently broad consensus.